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ABSTRACT 
Biofuels provide a new opportunity to enhance economic development in Tanzania. Drawing on detailed 
cost estimates, we develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to estimate the impact of 
different biofuel production scenarios on growth and poverty. Our results indicate that maximizing the 
poverty-reducing effects of a biofuels industry in Tanzania requires engaging and improving the 
productivity of smallholder farmers. Evidence shows that cassava-based ethanol production is more 
profitable than other feedstock options. Our findings also indicate that cassava generates higher levels of 
pro-poor growth than do sugarcane-based systems. However, if smallholder yields can be improved rather 
than expanding cultivated land, then sugarcane and cassava outgrower schemes can produce similar pro-
poor outcomes. We conclude that in so far as the public investments needed to establish a biofuels 
industry in Tanzania are in accordance with national development plans, producing biofuels will 
contribute to achieving the country’s overall development objectives.  
Keywords:  biofuels, growth, poverty, Tanzania, Africa 
    
 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Tanzania’s economy performed well over the last half-decade, with economic growth exceeding 5 percent 
per year. However, poverty has not declined significantly; the national headcount rate fell only slightly, 
from 35.7 to 33.6 percent, during 2001–2007 (World Bank 2009). This persistence in poverty is at least 
partly explained by slower growth in agricultural incomes (Pauw and Thurlow, 2010). Indeed, 
agriculture’s performance is particularly important for economic development in Tanzania, given that 
four-fifths of the labor force work on farms and a similar share of the poor population live in rural areas. 
Supporting the establishment of a biofuels industry may therefore offer Tanzania an opportunity to 
reinvigorate agricultural growth, create new jobs in rural areas, and strengthen efforts to reduce poverty. 
Evidence from other countries suggests that optimism about biofuels may be justified. In 
Mozambique, for example, Arndt et al. (2009) find that proposed biofuel investments will increase 
economic growth by half a percent each year over the coming decade, causing the national poverty rate to 
fall by 5 percentage points. This supports the view held by some that biofuels permit low-income 
countries to overcome their dependence on foreign oil while increasing farmers’ participation in the 
growth process (see Hausmann 2007). This optimism, however, is countered by uncertainty over possible 
trade-offs between biofuels and food production, and the effects that declining food supplies may have on 
poverty and food insecurity. This concern has received considerable attention in the biofuels debate (see 
Oxfam International 2007). Indeed, shifting resources away from food production could increase 
households’ reliance on marketed foods, and biofuels may not generate sufficient incomes for poorer 
households to offset rising food prices. Concerns over food security are therefore equally justified.  
Possible trade-offs between development objectives have prompted low-income countries such as 
Tanzania to consider a range of biofuel production scenarios. For example, in evaluating proposals from 
foreign investors, governments must decide which feedstocks are both economically viable and contribute 
to achieving national development objectives. Similarly, many governments are encouraging foreign 
investors to combine smallholder outgrower schemes with larger-scale plantation systems in order to 
reduce poverty while still ensuring reliable feedstock supplies.  
Understanding the consequences of different scenarios is crucial to maximizing the social benefits 
of biofuel investments. Accordingly, this paper uses a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) 
model of Tanzania to estimate the impact of alternative biofuel production scenarios on economic growth 
and employment. The model is also linked to a survey-based microsimulation module that estimates 
impacts on income poverty. Section 2 reviews the current debate surrounding biofuels. Section 3 presents 
the biofuel production scenarios that Tanzania’s government is considering, and Section 4 describes the 
DCGE model and how the various biofuel production scenarios are simulated. Section 5 presents the 
results, and the final section concludes with recommendations for policy.  2 
2.  THE BIOFUELS DEBATE 
Biofuel production has enjoyed tremendous growth in recent years.
1
Biofuel growth, however, is not without controversy. There are at least three major ongoing 
debates concerning biofuels. The first concerns the true environmental impacts of biofuels. Comparing 
fossil fuel and biofuel emissions only during the end-use stage is shortsighted; what really matters are the 
emissions over the entire life cycle of the fuel. Thus, emissions at the farm level (for example, due to land 
use and cultivation of feedstock) and emissions associated with the processing and transportation of 
biofuels should also be considered. Some of these emissions may be offset as carbon is captured by plant 
biomass grown as biofuel feedstock, and hence many life-cycle analyses show that biofuels (sometimes 
only minimally) reduce greenhouse gases (Cohen et al. 2008; Coyle 2007). Furthermore, these life-cycle 
analyses reveal that certain feedstocks are more efficient; for example, a United Nations study shows that 
Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol process has net negative emissions, while America’s corn ethanol can 
sometimes be more polluting than gasoline, depending on how the feedstock is grown and processed 
(UNEP 2009).  
 During 2000–2007 global production 
tripled in volume (Coyle 2007). In 2007–2008 alone, the share of ethanol in global gasoline increased 
from 3.8 to 5.5 percent, while the share of biodiesel in diesel increased from 0.9 to 1.5 percent (UNEP 
2009). More and more countries are adopting or setting higher biofuel consumption mandates (for 
example, 10 percent of transport energy in the European Union member states must come from biofuels 
by 2020), leading to consensus that the biofuels industry will grow even further. The interest in biofuels 
reflects two important shifts in countries’ energy policies. The first is a concerted effort by countries to 
reduce dependence on crude oil as an energy source, a policy prompted by the recent oil price instability 
and prospects of a steadily rising crude oil price (IEA 2009). The second reflects growing concerns about 
global warming and the environment. Ethanol, for example, emits about 70 percent less carbon dioxide 
than fossil fuels during combustion (UNEP 2009), which suggests that there are environmental benefits 
associated with a switch to biofuels.  
An area of contention, though, is land and fertilizer use. When increased feedstock production 
requires forest or grassland to be cleared, indirect emissions are higher, often pushing the emissions 
balance into positive territory (Fargione et al. 2008; Searchinger et al. 2009). Fertilizer is an important 
source of another greenhouse gas, nitrous oxide, which is sometimes ignored in life-cycle analyses 
(Melillo et al. 2009). When land clearing and fertilizer impacts are not accounted for in life-cycle 
analyses, the environmental benefits of biofuels vis-à-vis fossil fuels are overstated. Arndt et al. (2009) 
argue that these observations are particularly pertinent from a development perspective since optimism 
about the potential of biofuels as a driver of growth in developing countries is often based on the notion 
that these countries have surplus land available that can be cleared and cultivated for the production of 
biofuel feedstock (see further discussion below). 
A second debate concerns biofuels and their implications for food security. Certain biofuel 
feedstocks such as cassava or corn (in the United States) are also used as food and/or animal feed, and 
hence an increase in biofuel production may directly impact the supply and/or consumer prices of 
agricultural produce and meats. Food production may also be hampered by growth in biofuel feedstock 
production via indirect competition for resources such as land or labor. There is little doubt that increased 
biofuel production was a major driver of the sharp increases in the prices of corn, wheat, and soybean 
observed in 2006 (see Rosegrant 2008; Headey and Fan 2008). The ensuing “food crisis” had serious 
implications for poor consumers worldwide and their ability to satisfy basic consumption needs. Food 
security concerns are quelled somewhat by the prospects of second- and third-generation biofuels 
replacing first-generation biofuels within the next decade or so, once they become commercially viable 
due to technological gains and oil price increases. These next-generation technologies not only offer 
environmental advantages over existing technologies, but will also reduce competition for food and 
                                                       
1 The term biofuels in this study refers to bioalcohols such as ethanol (produced mostly from starch crops and sugarcane or 
molasses) and biodiesel (produced from vegetable or other plant oils and fats). 3 
natural resources given their use of biomass waste, wheat stalks, algae, and so on as feedstocks (IEA 
2008).  
A recent study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 2008) 
claims that only about one-quarter of land in Sub-Saharan Africa with potential for rainfed crop 
production is currently cultivated. This, together with the widely held perception that African agriculture 
has considerable scope for raising productivity (Diao et al. 2007), means that biofuel feedstocks may not 
necessarily displace food crops, and even where they do, food production can be maintained on less land 
through productivity enhancements. In this regard, the FAO (2008) argues that cash-crop production for 
markets does not necessarily come at the expense of food crops and that it may actually contribute to 
improving food security by raising household incomes. Of course, surplus land supplies are not unlimited 
everywhere in Africa. For example, in their study of Mozambique, Arndt et al. (2009) assume that only 
about half of planned biofuel crop production will take place on new land, while the other half will 
displace existing crops.  
A third issue concerns the potential for developing countries to benefit from the increased global 
demand for biofuels. Optimists believe that the Sub-Saharan African region, with its land endowments 
and relatively cheap labor, is particularly well placed to become a global biofuels player (Hausmann 
2007). The FAO (2008) believes that growing demand for biofuels and the resulting rise in agricultural 
commodity prices can present an opportunity to promote agricultural growth and rural development in 
developing countries. Compared with the natural resource extraction industries that often dominate 
investments in Africa, biofuel production (and particularly upstream production of feedstocks) is more 
labor-intensive and hence pro-poor (Arndt et al. 2009). The region already grows many of the major 
biofuel feedstocks in abundance, while existing first-generation biofuel technologies that can now be 
adopted are well matured and profitable at current oil prices. For example, new entrants into the ethanol 
industry can benefit from productivity gains realized in Brazil, which have caused production costs there 
to decline by between 3.8 and 5.7 percent every year for the past three decades (Moreira 2006).  
However, there are some pitfalls. First, with respect to land, it is pertinent that the “vast majority” 
of land in Africa is operated under customary (informal) tenure (Deininger 2003). This means that biofuel 
projects that require additional land to be cleared would need to have a strong local community element 
and political buy-in. This poses some challenges for biofuel investors, particularly with respect to the 
business model opted for. Feedstocks can either be supplied by local smallholders or grown on 
plantations. An outgrower approach will be more pro-poor since land rents accrue to the smallholders, 
while other crops grown by the smallholders could benefit from technology spillovers (Arndt et al. 2009). 
However, Arndt et al. and Caminiti et al. (2007) argue in favor of a mix of outgrower and estate 
production to ensure a steady supply of feedstocks. Plantation schemes, however, mean that benefits 
accrue to agribusiness or even foreign investors rather than local smallholders.  
A second concern is the long-term sustainability of the industry. When land clearing is necessary 
in order to establish new industries, the biofuels produced may seem less attractive to European and U.S. 
importers who demand sustainability and environmental compliance from suppliers. The future 
profitability of biofuels is also uncertain, with producers facing a cost price squeeze as feedstock prices 
rise and oil extraction technologies improve. African biofuel producers further face the challenge of 
competing against subsidized U.S. and European enterprises. Thus, even though market access is eased by 
free trade agreements, there are still various nontrade barriers to entry that need to be overcome.  
Similarly, there are concerns that volatility in world oil and commodity markets will undermine 
the profitability of biofuels, while also exposing developing countries to heightened risk in world 
markets. However, as of this writing, futures prices for oil start at US$70 per barrel in 2010 and rise 
continuously to more than US$100 per barrel by 2018. Thus, while concerns over market price volatility 
are legitimate, futures markets indicate high and rising prices. In short, there are substantial incentives to 
produce biofuels and these look to become even more pronounced over time. Sophisticated investors can 
also lock in prices favorable to biofuels production out to 2018. 
In summary, the opportunities for investing in biofuels in Africa abound. However, very few case 
studies exist that consider the true potential and the extent of the trade-offs, which is why studies such as 4 
this are important. Among these trade-offs, the most important is the issue of competition for land and 
labor. Where biofuel feedstocks do end up displacing other crops (particularly food crops), the 
implications should be carefully weighed. Ultimately, however, food security is not only about producing 
sufficient quantities of food within countries. Household income effects and the advantages of increased 
trade and lower dependence on oil imports may yield net nutritional benefits. Given the complexity of the 
impacts and the fact that they need to be understood at both national and international levels, global or 
national ex ante general equilibrium approaches provide the best tools for understanding the potential 
gains and losses (Kretschmer and Peterson, 2010). 
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3.  OPTIONS FOR PRODUCING BIOFUELS IN TANZANIA 
Identifying Biofuel Production Scenarios 
The FAO and the Government of Tanzania have identified a number of biofuel production scenarios 
using different feedstock crops and different types of downstream processing plants (see Cardona et al. 
2009). In our analysis we focus on a subset of these options in order to capture their core differences. The 
options identified by the FAO and examined in this study are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Food and Agriculture Organization's biofuel production options 
Feedstock  FAO 
option 
Description 
      Sugarcane 
juice (ethanol) 
1  Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 160,000 liters per day 
using juice from new sugarcane cultivars produced by smallholders. Production and 
sale of by-products included. 
        2  Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 236,000–277,000 liters 
per day using juice from new sugarcane produced on 12,000 hectares of large-scale 
commercial land and 3,000 hectares of smallholder outgrower land. Production and 
sale of by-products included. 
        3  Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 160,000 liters per day 
using juice from new sugarcane produced by increasing smallholders’ crop yields 
rather than expanding cropland area. Production and sale of by-products included. 
        4  Four small-scale ethanol processing plants with individual capacities of 44,000–
52,000 liters per day using juice from new sugarcane produced by smallholders. 
Production and sale of by-products included. 
      Molasses 
(ethanol) 
5  Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 80,000–85,000 liters 
per day using existing molasses produced and currently exported by sugar refineries. 
      Cassava 
(ethanol) 
8  Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 160,000 liters per day 
using dry cassava chips produced by increasing smallholders’ crop yields. 
  9 
 
Single large-scale ethanol processing plant with a capacity of 303,030 liters per day 
using dry cassava chips, 40% of which are produced by increasing smallholders’ 
crop yields and 60% are from on-site large-scale commercial production. 




Single large-scale biodiesel processing plant with a capacity of 70,000 liters per day 
using jatropha produced by smallholders.  
     
Source: Cardona et al. (2009). 
The FAO scenarios differ in terms of four characteristics: (1) the type of feedstock used and 
biofuel produced, (2) the scale of feedstock production (that is, smallholder versus estate), (3) the way in 
which feedstock production is expanded (meaning increasing yields or harvested area), and (4) the scale 
of downstream biofuel processing plants. These differences are presented in Table 2, which shows the 
various scenarios simulated in this paper. 6 
Table 2. Simulated biofuel production scenarios 






(% of land from 
displacement) 
Scale of biofuel 




              Sugarcane 
(ethanol) 






  Sugar 2  2  Small/large mix  Low  























              Molasses 
(ethanol) 
Molasses  5  Imported  -  -  Large  
(166 l/mt) 
              Cassava 
(ethanol) 












  Cassava 3  9  Small/large mix  High 





              Jatropha 
(biodiesel) 






             
Source: Authors’ calculations using information from Cardona et al. (2009). 
The first five scenarios (Sugar 1–5) refer to ethanol produced from sugarcane juice. In the first 
scenario (Sugar 1), all feedstock is produced by smallholder farmers through an outgrower scheme and is 
supplied to a single large processing plant. This is equivalent to the first FAO production option presented 
in Table 1. The second scenario is similar to the second FAO option in that it adopts a mixed production 
system in which one-fifth of the feedstock is produced by smallholders and the rest is produced by large-
scale estates or plantations. The third scenario does not correspond to a particular FAO option since it 
assumes that all feedstock is produced on large-scale farms. This additional scenario allows us to contrast 
the impacts of purely small- and large-scale production systems.  
The remaining two sugarcane scenarios are variations on Sugar 1, where all feedstock is produced 
by smallholders through an outgrower scheme. In the Sugar 4 scenario, sugarcane production is increased 
by raising smallholders’ land yields (from 43 to 70 tons per hectare) rather than by expanding the amount 
of land under sugarcane cultivation. This reduces the amount of land currently used for agriculture that is 
displaced by biofuel production. The final sugarcane scenario (Sugar 5) still uses low yields but now 
assumes that downstream processing takes place using a number of small-scale plants. As shown later in 
this section, using small-scale processing plants increases the amount of labor required for biofuel 
production.  
Molasses is another feedstock that could be used to produce ethanol in Tanzania. Molasses is a 
by-product of sugarcane refining, and all the molasses currently being produced is exported. Producing 
ethanol from molasses would thus redirect exports for use as feedstock in the domestic biofuels industry. 
This means that no additional feedstock needs to be produced. Only one molasses scenario is considered 
in our analysis, and it is equivalent to the fifth FAO production option. 7 
We also consider the use of cassava as a biofuel feedstock. In each scenario we assume that 
production is by smallholders through an outgrower scheme and that processing is performed by large-
scale processing plants. The first two scenarios differ in that Cassava 1 assumes that cassava production is 
achieved through extensification (meaning land expansion) while Cassava 2 assumes that crop yields are 
increased (from 10 to 20 tons per hectare), thereby limiting the amount of land displaced by the new 
biofuels industry. The Cassava 3 scenario assumes a mixed production system, with 40 percent of 
feedstock obtained from smallholders through yield improvements (as in Cassava 2) and the rest produced 
by large-scale commercial farmers situated close to a large-scale processing plant. Finally, we consider 
the use of jatropha oilseeds to produce biodiesel. Jatropha has received considerable attention from 
governments in developing countries, since it is inedible and should thus only indirectly affect food 
production. Jatropha is already grown in India and production trials are being conducted in African 
countries, such as Mozambique (Arndt et al. 2009). In our Jatropha scenario, production is via a 
smallholder outgrower scheme linked to a large-scale biodiesel processing plant, with high crop yields of 
4 tons per hectare.  
The FAO options in Table 1 produce different volumes of ethanol or biodiesel. This complicates 
direct comparisons of the scenarios. For example, if the Sugar 2 scenario generates more economic 
growth than Sugar 1, this may be due either to the larger volume of biofuel being produced or to inclusion 
of more larger-scale farmers. Therefore, to make scenarios comparable we simulate the same volume of 
biofuels under all scenarios rather than modeling the varying amounts identified in Table 1. More 
specifically, we model the establishment of a biofuels industry capable of producing one billion liters of 
ethanol or biodiesel per year (that is, three million liters per day).  
Estimating Production Costs and Technologies 
The biofuel scenarios in Table 2 contrast the economic impacts of different feedstocks and types of 
processing plants. These scenarios will produce different outcomes because they use different 
technologies (meaning factor and intermediate inputs) and generate different profit rates for farmers and 
downstream processing plants. Cardona et al. (2009) estimate itemized production costs when they assess 
the economic viability of the various biofuel scenarios. These cost estimates are shown in Table 3 below.  
Table 3. Production cost estimates for biofuel scenarios 
















  FAO 1  FAO 2  FAO 3  FAO 4  FAO 5  FAO 8  FAO 8  FAO 10 
                  Cost per liter (US$)  0.567  0.434  0.529  0.632  0.735  0.469  0.369  0.828 
                  Raw materials  0.416  0.310  0.393  0.393  0.514  0.252  0.190  0.700 
Service fluids  0.039  0.025  0.027  0.025  0.082  0.086  0.079  0.001 
Labor  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.002 
Maintenance   0.014  0.014  0.015  0.025  0.014  0.025  0.020  0.006 
Operating charges  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
General plant costs  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.014  0.007  0.013  0.010  0.004 
Administrative costs  0.038  0.029  0.035  0.037  0.050  0.030  0.024  0.057 
Capital depreciation  0.063  0.063  0.070  0.150  0.067  0.064  0.045  0.085 
Coproducts  -0.011  -0.016  -0.019  -0.016  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.028 
                 
Source: Cardona et al. (2009). 
The cost of producing ethanol in Tanzania ranges from US$0.43 per liter under a mixed small- 
and large-scale production system (that is, Sugar 2) to US$0.74 per liter using molasses as a feedstock. 
The low-cost scenarios (that is, Sugar 2, Cassava 2, and Cassava 3) compare favorably with current 8 
ethanol production costs in countries such as Brazil (US$0.47), the United States (US$0.46), and India 
(US$0.52). However, the estimated costs of producing ethanol from smallholder-based sugarcane and 
from molasses suggest that Tanzania is not competitive given current crop yields and the proposed 
processing technologies. In our analysis we assume that the domestic ethanol price received by processing 
plants is US$0.56 per liter, implying that processing plants in some of our scenarios run at a loss. 
Similarly, the biodiesel production cost is US$0.83 per liter in Tanzania, which is above the landed price 
at Dar es Salaam harbor (US$0.77) (Johnson and Holloway 2007). If ethanol prices were higher than 
US$0.56 per liter then the profits earned by foreign investors would increase. Since these profits are, by 
assumption, repatriated, changing the price of ethanol does not greatly affect the welfare outcomes of 
biofuels expansion for Tanzanian households.    
Using the above processing costs and farm crop budgets, we estimate the production technologies 
for the 10 biofuel scenarios modeled in this paper. These are summarized in Table 4. The top half of the 
table shows the inputs required and outputs generated for 100 hectares of land allocated to feedstock 
production. From the first three columns we see that smallholder crop yields (that is, Sugar 1) are lower 
than larger-scale farmers’ yields (meaning Sugar 3), implying that 100 hectares of small-scale farmland 
produces half the output of plantations on the same amount of land (that is, 4,280 versus 8,400 tons). 
Small-scale farms are also more labor-intensive (meaning 0.4 hectares per worker compared to 2.4 
hectares per worker on larger farms). Increasing smallholders’ sugarcane yields significantly increases 
production levels per 100 hectares of land (that is, to 7,000 tons) but requires additional labor for weeding 
and harvesting. Cassava production is also labor-intensive and requires more land per liter of ethanol than 
sugarcane. The mixed cassava production system (that is, Cassava 3) is more labor-intensive than the 
equivalent smallholder scenario (that is, Cassava 2) since new commercial farms require additional 
laborers whereas smallholders increase production by raising yields on their existing farmland. Finally, 
the Jatropha scenario is also labor-intensive, albeit less so than smallholder cassava and sugarcane. 
The lower half of Table 4 shows the inputs required to produce 100,000 liters of ethanol or 
biodiesel. The first four columns refer to large-scale processing plants and so the technologies are the 
same. The Sugar 1–4 scenarios differ with respect to the scale of feedstock production and, hence, the 
required amount of land and number of farmworkers. The number of workers used in processing biofuels 
is much smaller than the number of farmworkers used in producing the feedstock (for example, 1 
processing worker is needed for every 121 farmworkers in the more labor-intensive Sugar 1 scenario). 
The labor-intensity of biofuels processing is, however, higher in the Sugar 5 scenario, which uses small-
scale processing plants. Finally, cassava processing is more labor-intensive, although the large amount of 
land required to produce the feedstock makes it the most labor-intensive option overall.  
In summary, 10 biofuel production scenarios are considered in this analysis. These scenarios 
compare different feedstocks, small- and large-scale production structures, and intensive and extensive 
feedstock production options. The study draws on detailed estimates of production costs based on the 
specific technologies used in each scenario. In the next section we integrate these technologies within an 
economywide model of Tanzania in order to estimate their impacts on growth and poverty.  
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Table 4. Biofuel production technologies under alternative scenarios 
Production characteristics for biofuels  





















(FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 
10) 
                         Land employed (ha)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  n/a  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
   Crop production (mt)  4,280  7,575  8,399  6,999  4,280  n/a  1,000  2,000  2,000  400 
   Farmworkers employed (people)  225.2  78.4  41.8  81.5  209.5  n/a  215.7  66.6  153.3  130.2 
                         Land yield (mt / ha)  42.8  75.8  84.0  70.0  42.8  n/a  10.0  20.0  20.0  4.0 
   Farm labor yield (mt / person)  19.0  96.6  201.1  85.9  20.4  n/a  4.6  30.0  13.0  3.1 
                         Land per farmworker (ha / person)  0.44  1.27  2.39  1.23  0.48  n/a  0.46  1.50  0.65  0.77 
   Capital per hectare (cap. units / ha)  1.76  3.54  3.98  n/a  1.64  n/a  0.72  n/a  1.4  1.3 
   Labor–capital ratio (people / cap. unit)  1.28  0.22  0.10  n/a  1.28  n/a  2.99  n/a  1.10  1.01 
                         Biofuel produced (liters)  297,078  525,819  582,999  485,847  297,078  n/a  183,328  366,636  366,636  140,008 
   Processing workers employed (people)  2.33  3.15  3.36  4.18  10.33  n/a  0.45  0.91  0.91  1.36 
                     
Production characteristics for biofuels 




















(FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 
10) 
                         Biofuel produced (liters)  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000 
   Feedstock inputs (mt)  1,441  1,441  1,441  1,441  1,441  600  546  546  546  286 
   Feedstock yield (liters / mt)  69.41  69.41  69.41  69.41  69.41  166.7  183.31  183.31  183.31  349.92 
   Land employed (ha)  33.66  19.02  17.15  20.58  33.66  n/a  54.55  27.28  27.28  71.42 
   Farmworkers employed (people)  75.81  14.92  7.16  16.77  70.51  n/a  117.66  18.17  41.82  92.97 
   Processing workers employed (people)  0.78  0.60  0.58  0.86  3.48  0.33  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.97 
   Capital employed (capital units)  105.2  315.8  342.6  183.6  144.9  133.5  214.5  214.5  373.7  40.3 
                     
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Cardona et al. (2009); Coles (2009); Kapinga et al. (2009); Rothe, Görg, and Zimmer (2007); and the DCGE model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
 Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
 Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing10 
4. MODELING IMPACTS ON GROWTH AND POVERTY 
Structure of the Tanzanian Economy 
Table 5 shows the structure of the Tanzanian economy in 2007, which is the base year of the economic 
model. Agriculture generates one-third of national gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of total 
employment. Most farmers are smallholders, with average landholdings of 1.6 hectares. They produce 
most of the country’s food, which dominates both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. However, 
Tanzania as a whole relies on imported foods (mainly cereals), which account for 15 percent of total 
imports and 20 percent of all processed foods in the country. This dependence on food imports stems in 
part from the low crop yields achieved by smallholders due to their reliance on traditional rainfed farming 
technologies. Larger-scale commercial farmers are more heavily engaged in nonfood export crops, such 
as coffee, tobacco, and tea, which together account for almost a third of total merchandise exports.  
Table 5. Structure of Tanzania’s economy, 2007 






  GDP  Employ-
ment 
Exports  Imports 
              Total GDP   100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  9.44  22.01 
                       Agriculture  31.82  82.46  34.89  6.11  13.23  7.28 
     Food crops  19.06  39.97  2.57  5.83  1.64  10.05 
     Traditional exports  3.20  12.22  21.50  0.28  63.45  7.08 
     Biofuel crops  0.00  0.00   0.00  0.00    0.00  13.74 
     Other agriculture  9.56  30.27  10.81    0.00  14.98    0.00 
                       Mining  3.94  0.17  25.06  4.61  82.26  72.26 
   Manufacturing  8.84  1.46  12.83  87.88  8.26  61.42 
     Food processing  5.62  1.12  2.13  10.01  2.00  20.80 
     Biofuel processing  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  100.00    0.00 
     Other manufacturing  3.22  0.35  10.69  77.87  21.79  83.87 
   Other industries  10.35  0.99             
                       Private services  32.36  13.45  27.22  1.40  8.76  1.06 
   Government services  12.69  1.47   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
             
 Source: Tanzania 2007 social accounting matrix. 
Nonagriculture is dominated by gold mining, which accounts for a third of total merchandise 
earnings. Mining does not, however, create much employment or value added, and most nonfarm workers 
in the country are employed in construction (“other industries”) and private services. Incomes in many of 
these nonfarm sectors, such as trade, are on average only slightly higher than those in agriculture. This 
partly reflects the low levels of education and shortage of skilled labor in the country. Indeed, most of 
Tanzania’s workforce has not completed primary schooling.  
The economywide model captures Tanzania’s initial conditions and its detailed economic 
structure. This class of economic models is often used to examine external shocks and policies in low-
income countries. The strength of these models is their ability to measure linkages between producers, 
households, and the government, while also accounting for resource constraints and their role in 
determining product and factor prices. These models are, however, limited by their underlying 
assumptions and the quality of the data used to calibrate them. The remainder of this section explains the 
workings of the DCGE model.  11 
Core General Equilibrium Model  
Table 6 presents the equations of a simple DCGE model illustrating how biofuel investments affect 
economic outcomes in our analysis. Producers in each sector s produce a level of output Q by employing 
the factors of production F under constant returns to scale (exogenous productivity α) and fixed 
production technologies (fixed factor input shares δ) (eq. [1]). Profit maximization implies that factor 
payments W are equal to average production revenues (eq. [2]). Labor, land, and capital supply s are 
fixed, implying full employment and intersector mobility (eq. [10]). This means that as new biofuel 
sectors expand they generate additional demand for factor inputs, which then affect economywide factor 
returns and production in other sectors by increasing resource competition.  
Table 6. Core model equations  
Production function         (1) 
Factor payments    (2) 
Import supply    (3) 
Export demand    (4) 
Household income    (5) 
Consumption demand    (6) 
Investment demand    (7) 
Current account balance    (8) 
Product market equilibrium    (9) 
Factor market equilibrium    (10) 
Land and labor expansion    f is land and labor  (11) 
Capital accumulation    f is capital  (12) 
Technical change    (13) 
   12 
Table 6. Continued 
        Subscripts  Exogenous variables   
f  Factor groups (land, labor, and capital)  b  Foreign savings balance (foreign currency units) 
h  Household groups  s  Total factor supply 
s  Economic sectors  w  World import and export prices 
t  Time periods  Exogenous parameters   
Endogenous variables    α  Production shift parameter (factor productivity) 
D  Household consumption demand quantity  β  Household average budget share 
E  Exchange (local/foreign currency units)  γ  Hicks neutral rate of technical change 
F  Factor demand quantity  δ  Factor input share parameter 
I  Investment demand quantity  η  Capital depreciation rate 
M  Import supply quantity  θ  Household share of factor income 
P  Commodity price  κ  Base price per unit of capital stock 
Q  Output quantity  ρ  Investment commodity expenditure share 
W  Average factor return  υ  Household marginal propensity to save 
X  Export demand quantity  φ  Land and labor supply growth rate 
Y  Total household income     
       
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Foreign trade is determined by comparing domestic and world prices, where the latter are fixed 
under a small-country assumption. The simple model implements trade as a complementarity problem. If 
domestic prices exceed world import prices wm (adjusted by exchange rate E), then the quantity of 
imports M increases (eq. [3]). Conversely, if domestic prices fall below world export prices we, then 
export demand X increases (eq. [4]). To ensure macroeconomic consistency, a flexible exchange rate 
adjusts to maintain a fixed current account balance b (measured in foreign currency units) (eq. [8]). This 
implies that as biofuel exports rise (or petroleum imports decline) the exchange rate will appreciate, thus 
affecting the competitiveness of nonbiofuel exports and imports. 
Factor incomes are distributed to households using fixed income shares θ based on households’ 
initial factor endowments (eq. [5]). Incomes Y are then saved (based on marginal propensities to save υ) 
or spent on consumption C (according to marginal budget shares β) (eq. [6]). Household savings and 
foreign capital inflows are collected in a national savings pool and used to finance investment demand I 
(meaning a savings-driven investment closure) (eq. [7]). Finally, prices P equilibrate product markets so 
that demand for each commodity equals supply (eq. [9]). The model therefore links production patterns to 
household incomes through changes in factor employment and returns. 
The model’s variables and parameters are calibrated to observed data from a national social 
accounting matrix that captures the initial equilibrium structure of the Tanzanian economy in 2007. 
Parameters are then adjusted over time to reflect demographic and economic changes and the model is re-
solved for a series of new equilibriums for the eight-year period 2007–2015. Between periods the model 
is updated to reflect exogenous rates of land and labor expansion φ (eq. [11]). The rate of capital 
accumulation is determined endogenously, with the level of investment I from the previous period 
converted into new capital stocks using a fixed capital price κ (eq. [12]). This is added to previous capital 
stocks after applying a fixed long-term rate of depreciation π. Finally, the model captures total factor 
productivity through the production function’s shift parameter α, with the rate of technical change γ 
determined exogenously (eq. [13]). 
Extensions in the Full Tanzania Model 
The above model illustrates how economic growth and household incomes are linked in our analysis. 
However, the full model drops certain restrictive assumptions (see Thurlow 2005). Constant elasticity of 
substitution production functions allow factor substitution based on relative factor prices (meaning δ is no 13 
longer fixed). The model identifies 58 sectors (that is, 26 in agriculture, 22 industries, and 10 services). 
Intermediate demand in each sector, which was excluded from the simple model, is now determined by 
fixed technology coefficients ( Leontief demand). Based on the 2000/01 Household Budget Survey (HBS) 
(Tanzania, NBS 2001), labor markets are segmented across three skill groups: (1) workers with less than 
primary education, (2) workers with primary and possibly some secondary schooling, and (3) workers 
who have completed secondary or tertiary schooling. Agricultural land is divided across small- and large-
scale farms based on the 2002/03 Agricultural Sample Survey (Tanzania, MINAG 2004). All factors are 
still assumed to be fully employed, but capital is immobile across sectors. New capital from past 
investment is allocated to sectors according to profit rate differentials under a “putty-clay” specification. 
This means that once capital stocks have been invested it is difficult to transfer them to other uses.  
International trade is captured by allowing production and consumption to shift imperfectly 
between domestic and foreign markets, depending on the relative prices of imports, exports, and domestic 
goods (inclusive of relevant sales and trade taxes). This differs from the simple model, which assumed 
perfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods (meaning homogenous products). This extension 
captures differences in domestic and foreign products and allows for observed two-way trade. Tanzania is 
still considered a small economy, such that world prices are fixed and the exchange rate (that is, price 
index of tradable to nontradable goods) adjusts to maintain a fixed current account balance. Production 
and trade elasticities are drawn from Dimaranan (2006). 
Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility function so that a linear expenditure system 
determines consumption with nonunitary income elasticities (estimated using HBS). Households are 
disaggregated across rural/urban and farm/nonfarm groups and by per capita expenditure quintiles, giving 
a total of 15 representative households in the full DCGE model. Households pay taxes to the government 
based on fixed direct and indirect tax rates. Tax revenues finance exogenous recurrent spending, resulting 
in an endogenous fiscal deficit. Finally, the model includes a simple consumption-side microsimulation 
module where each respondent in HBS is linked to their corresponding representative household in the 
DCGE model. Changes in commodity prices and each household groups’ consumption spending are 
passed down from the DCGE model to the survey respondents, where their total per capita consumption 
and poverty measures are recalculated. 
Modeling Biofuel Production 
Biofuels are not currently produced in Tanzania and so there is initially no biofuels sector in the 2007 
social accounting matrix used to calibrate the DCGE model. However, the production cost information in 
Table 3 and farm crop budgets provide the intermediate technology vectors needed to create these new 
sectors in the model. We initially create negligibly small feedstock and processing sectors representing 
different biofuel technology vectors. The DCGE model is first run forward over the 2007–2015 period 
assuming no expansion in biofuels production. This produces a baseline “without biofuels” scenario. 
Then in the biofuel simulations we expand the size of the feedstock and processing subsectors to produce 
one billion liters of biofuels. A conceptual framework for these simulations is shown in Figure 1.  
We smoothly introduce biofuels production over the 2007-2015 period, reflecting the likely 
gradual establishment of the industry. Biofuel expansion is assumed to be driven entirely by foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and all profits generated in the biofuel sectors are remitted abroad (after applying 
average corporate tax rates). The decision to invest is thus resolved exogenously by foreign investors, and 
we assume that the level of investment remains consistent with necessary profitability. Biofuel producers 
must, however, compete with other sectors for intermediate inputs and land and labor resources. In the 
DCGE model we assume full employment, which means that total labor supplies are fixed and increasing 
labor demand per unit of land raises workers’ wages. Feedstock production also displaces lands used for 
existing crops, since these lands will be assigned to new biofuel investments, and smallholder farmers 
will also reallocate resources toward feedstocks. Thus, although new lands may be available to feedstock 
producers, we expect that at least some existing lands will be displaced by biofuel crops. Table 2 shows 
that for most scenarios we assume that half the lands used by biofuel feedstocks come from lands already 14 
in use by smallholder farmers.
2
Figure 1. Conceptual framework  
 There is no land displacement in the Sugar 4 and Cassava 2 scenarios 
since feedstocks are produced entirely through intensification (meaning raising yields). The gray shaded 
areas in Figure 1 represent new foreign capital and cropland resources, which cause national production to 
expand in the simulations. 
 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
We assume that all biofuels will be exported. However, it is possible that some of the ethanol 
produced in Tanzania may be blended with imported petroleum for domestic use (see Cardona et al. 
2009). However, if the Government of Tanzania does not subsidize domestic ethanol, the difference 
between increasing biofuel exports and reducing petroleum imports is small (meaning the effect on the 
balance of payments is symmetrical). Therefore, assuming all biofuels are exported will not change our 
findings. Similarly, since molasses production involves redirecting existing exports to biofuel production, 
we assume that all molasses feedstocks are effectively imported, which offsets the decline in molasses 
exports required in the Molasses scenario. The model includes coproducts produced during the biofuel 
production process, the sale of which helps reduce ethanol and biodiesel production costs. We do not, 
however, explicitly model markets for coproducts, but assume that they are used to reduce fuel and 
electricity inputs during biofuel processing.  
                                                       
2 The assumption of 50 percent land displacement implies that although land is relatively abundant in Tanzania, there is a 
limit to the availability of large contiguous pieces of land that would be needed for large-scale commercial and small-scale 
outgrower production approaches. Some displacement is therefore inevitable. Moreover, labor is also a scarce resource in 
Tanzania, especially during planting and harvesting periods. So expanding feedstock production will force farmers to reallocate 
their own labor resources or become laborers on large-scale commercial farms, thereby reducing the amount of labor available 



















































































5.  MODEL RESULTS 
Baseline Scenario 
We first calibrate the DCGE model to track observed trends in key demographic and macroeconomic 
indicators (see Table 7). Population growth is set at 2.5 percent per year during 2007–2015. The skilled 
labor supply grows faster than unskilled labor in all scenarios, reflecting gradual improvements in 
educational attainment. Livestock stocks and agricultural land expand by 1 percent each year, capturing 
rising population density, especially in rural areas. In order to achieve recently observed growth rates in 
GDP, total factor productivity growth is set at 2.7 percent per year during the simulation period. The 
baseline scenario also captures the recent poor performance of the agricultural sector (Pauw and Thurlow, 
2010). 16 
Table 7. Core macroeconomic assumptions and results, 2007–2015 





















      (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                              Average annual growth rate, 2007–2015 (%) 
                          Population  31,683  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50 
                          Total GDP  100.00  4.61  4.86  4.95  4.97  4.98  4.88  4.72  4.86  4.97  4.99  4.87 
   Labor supply  56.07  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12 
      Primary  42.54  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
      Secondary  12.17  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50 
      Tertiary  1.36  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50  2.50 
   Capital stock  17.53  2.52  2.62  2.62  2.62  2.63  2.62  2.51  2.59  2.59  2.61  2.55 
   Livestock stock  2.20  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
   Land supply  24.20  1.00  1.24  1.13  1.12  1.29  1.24  1.00  1.38  1.38  1.27  1.50 
      Small-scale  22.48  1.00  1.26  0.91  0.87  1.00  1.26  1.00  1.41  1.00  0.87  1.54 
      Large-scale  1.72  1.00  1.00  3.76  4.08  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  3.95  1.00 
                         
    Final-year value, 2015 
                          Real exchange rate  1.00  1.07  0.99  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.05  1.01  1.01  1.02  1.00 
Consumer prices  1.00  1.06  1.03  1.03  1.03  1.03  1.04  1.05  1.04  1.04  1.04  1.04 
Cereals prices  1.00  1.16  1.13  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.13  1.14  1.15  1.13  1.14  1.16 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  
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Changes in Agricultural Production  
In the biofuel simulations we increase the amount of land and FDI allocated to biofuel sectors. We 
assume that only half of the biofuel land requirements will displace land already being cultivated. We 
therefore expect an increase in the total amount of land under cultivation. This is shown in the third 
column of Table 7, where the rate of land expansion for smallholders increases from 1.00 percent under 
the baseline scenario to 1.26 percent per year under the Sugar 1 scenario. Conversely, as we shift toward 
larger-scale feedstock production (in Sugar 2 and Sugar 3), the expansion rate of smallholder lands drops 
below 1 percent per year. This is because we assume that it is smallholders’ lands that are displaced when 
large-scale plantations expand feedstock production. However, no smallholder land is displaced in the 
Sugar 4 and Cassava 2 scenarios, as production increases are achieved by improving yields. There is 
some land displacement in the mixed cassava production scenario (Cassava 3), because the portion that is 
produced by commercial farmers requires additional lands, half of which come from smallholders. 
Finally, the sugarcane needed as feedstock for molasses production is already produced in Tanzania and 
so there is no change in land expansion rates under the Molasses scenario.  
Displacing lands to produce biofuel feedstocks causes production of other crops to contract (see 
Table 8). The debate surrounding biofuels in low-income countries centers on their possible negative 
effects on food production. Our findings suggest that, in the case of Tanzania, it is export crops that 
experience the largest declines in production. This is because in our simulations biofuels eventually 
account for almost a third of total merchandise export earnings by 2015. Since we assume that the current 
account balance is fixed in foreign currency, the increase in exports causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate relative to the baseline scenario (see Table 7). This reduces the competitiveness of traditional 
export crops, such as coffee, tobacco, and tea, and these exports decline. For example, the amount of land 
allocated to export crops falls by 191,000 hectares in the Sugar 1 scenario. In the same scenario the land 
allocated to food crops increases slightly, as farmers reallocate land away from export crops and rising 
incomes raise food demand. Food crop production therefore increases under most biofuel production 
scenarios. The only exception is the Cassava 1 scenario, in which a large amount of land is needed to 
produce the same amount of biofuel, causing food production to fall. However, even in this scenario, the 
trade-off between food production and biofuels remains small, with export crops more severely affected. 18 
Table 8. Agricultural production results, 2007–2015 






Deviation from baseline scenario final value, 2015 

















  (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                          Biofuel (1,000 l)  0  0  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
                          Cropland (1,000 ha)  8,207  8,887  168  95  86  0  168  0  273  0  50  357 
   Biofuel crops  0  0  337  190  172  0  337  0  545  0  99  714 
   Food crops  7,236  7,711  23  60  65  163  20  42  -85  142  45  -155 
      Maize  2,690  2,812  22  32  33  67  21  17  -14  59  24  -33 
      Rice  546  592  1  6  6  15  1  4  -12  12  3  -20 
      Cassava  660  671  4  7  7  17  3  4  -6  15  4  -9 
   Export crops  970  1,175  -191  -155  -150  -163  -188  -42  -187  -142  -127  -202 
                          Production (1,000 mt)                         
   Biofuel feedstock      14,407  14,407  14,407  14,407  14,407  1,000  5,455  5,455  5,455  2,857 
   Food crops                         
      Maize  2,354  2,713  18  38  41  60  18  15  -16  52  21  -14 
      Rice  1,084  1,268  -1  13  15  19  0  5  -18  15  4  -16 
      Cassava  5,284  5,873  26  68  73  137  26  35  -56  123  33  -65 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  
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The same amount of ethanol exports is produced under Sugar 1 and Sugar 3, causing a similar 
appreciation of the real exchange rate in these two scenarios (see Table 7). This suggests that moving to 
larger-scale feedstock production does not remove the negative impacts for nonbiofuels exporters. Larger-
scale feedstock production technologies do, however, favor food crop production, since the higher yields 
of large-scale farmers mean that less land is needed for biofuel feedstocks and hence more land 
previously used by traditional export crops is reallocated to food crops rather than being used to produce 
biofuels. This finding suggests that any trade-offs that do exist between biofuels and food production are 
likely to be smaller when feedstocks are produced by larger-scale farmers.  
Alternatively, when smallholders’ yields are increased there is no displacement of land and so 
traditional export crop lands are reallocated entirely to food crops (see Sugar 4 and Cassava 2). The same 
is true in the Molasses scenario, in which no additional lands are needed to produce feedstocks. These 
scenarios clearly indicate that the exchange rate effect is more important than heightened resource 
competition when determining the overall effect of biofuel investments on food production in Tanzania. 
Arndt et al. (2009) reported similar findings for Mozambique, although biofuel investments reduced food 
crop production because Mozambique does not have a large export crop sector and so at least some lands 
under food crops are displaced by biofuel feedstocks.  
Impacts on Economic Growth and Employment  
Table 9 shows the impact of biofuel investments on the various sectors’ real GDP growth rates. FDI in the 
biofuel sectors expands agriculture’s capital stock and also brings new lands under cultivation. This 
expansion in resources causes agriculture’s growth rate to increase in all the biofuel scenarios. Larger-
scale production of sugarcane feedstocks (that is, Sugar 3) generates larger gains in agricultural GDP than 
does production through smallholder outgrower schemes (that is, Sugar 1). There are also larger gains in 
the manufacturing sector under the Sugar 3 scenario, due to its smaller impact on food crops and 
downstream food processing. However, all sugarcane scenarios reduce processed-food production 
because the appreciated exchange rate heightens competition in this import-intensive sector (see Table 5). 
Ultimately, the trade-offs from biofuel production are smaller than the gains from new investments in the 
biofuels industry. As a result, national GDP growth rates increase in all the biofuel scenarios. 20 
Table 9. Sector growth results, 2007–2015 







Deviation from baseline scenario growth rate (%-point) 

















  (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                          Total GDP   100.00  4.61  0.25  0.34  0.35  0.37  0.27  0.11  0.25  0.35  0.37  0.26 
                             Agriculture  31.82  2.20  0.21  0.33  0.34  0.50  0.19  0.00  0.25  0.55  0.38  0.67 
     Food crops  19.06  1.88  0.00  0.13  0.15  0.22  0.01  0.06  -0.17  0.19  0.04  -0.16 
     Traditional exports  3.20  2.49  -1.49  -0.97  -0.90  -1.11  -1.45  -0.23  -1.61  -0.97  -0.92  -1.61 
     Biofuel crops  0.00  0.00  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
     Other agriculture  9.56  2.71  -0.27  -0.14  -0.12  -0.10  -0.26  -0.03  -0.33  -0.08  -0.14  -0.28 
                             Mining  3.94  7.17  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
   Manufacturing  8.84  5.49  0.00  1.11  1.25  0.53  0.24  0.51  0.57  0.71  1.52  -0.27 
     Food processing  5.62  3.82  -0.12  -0.05  -0.04  0.03  -0.12  -0.01  -0.18  0.03  -0.03  -0.14 
     Biofuel processing  0.00  0.00  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
     Other manufacturing  3.22  8.03  -1.16  -1.07  -1.05  -1.03  -1.13  -0.40  -1.01  -0.94  -0.71  -0.98 
   Other industries  0.31  8.03  -0.97  -0.91  -0.91  -0.87  -0.95  -0.34  -0.79  -0.77  -0.57  -0.73 
                             Private services  45.05  5.35  0.32  0.18  0.16  0.28  0.32  0.08  0.16  0.17  0.14  0.17 
   Government services  0.45  5.18  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.11  0.03  -0.02  0.06  0.12  0.10  0.12 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  
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Generally, the more profitable the biofuel processing technology is, the larger its impact on 
national economic growth. For example, the scenarios with the largest positive gains in total GDP are 
Sugar 2/3 and Cassava 2/3, which are among the more profitable ethanol technologies in Tanzania (see 
Table 3). Improving crop yields rather than displacing existing cultivated lands also generates large 
economywide gains. This is because these sectors enhance the returns to agricultural resources without 
greatly reducing food production. By contrast, producing ethanol using molasses has little effect on 
national GDP since there are no growth linkages to the agricultural sector and only small gains in 
manufacturing. Moreover, growth effects under the mixed cassava production approach (that is, Cassava 
3) are not as large as those under the mixed sugarcane approach. This is because cassava is a land-
intensive crop and so establishing new large-scale commercial cassava farms displaces more land from 
other crops than does sugarcane. Similarly, obtaining cassava feedstock solely by increasing 
smallholders’ yields (that is, Cassava 2) generates larger growth effects, since no displacement of land for 
other crops is necessary. Finally, the Jatropha scenario has smaller growth effects since the sector is less 
profitable and so generates lower levels of value added, especially for downstream processors.  
Table 10 reports impacts on employment. The number of new jobs created in the biofuels sector 
varies greatly across scenarios. The low labor-intensity of large-scale sugarcane production means that 
only 72,000 farm jobs are created in the Sugar 3 scenario. Conversely, outgrower schemes employ far 
more farmers (see Table 4), with 758,000 additional workers producing sugarcane in the Sugar 1 
scenario.
3
                                                       
3 Note that employment numbers do not adjust for underemployment and include unpaid family members. 
 Sugarcane is less labor-intensive than cassava production, and it is the Cassava 1 and Jatropha 
scenarios that engage the most workers in feedstock production. Moreover, although improving crop 
yields among smallholders does not require additional lands in the Sugar 4 and Cassava 2 scenarios, it 
still requires additional workers, especially during harvesting. For example, doubling cassava yields in the 
Cassava 2 scenario draws an additional 182,000 farmers into cassava production. This result emphasizes 
an often overlooked dimension of the biofuels debate, which has typically focused on land displacement 
(especially for food crops) and ignored labor “displacement.” Thus, even if all feedstock production were 
to take place on new lands (meaning no land displacement), nonfeedstock crop production would still 
decline due to increased competition over nonland resources (meaning labor).22 
Table 10. Employment results, 2007–2015 







Deviation from baseline scenario final employment, 2015 














Cassava 3  Jatropha 
  (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                          Total (1,000s workers)   19,010  22,487  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                             Agriculture  15,675  18,565  -95  -78  -76  -103  -101  -37  -23  -68  -50  -9 
     Food crops  7,597  8,977  -76  188  221  178  -55  54  -269  146  -4  -83 
     Traditional exports  2,323  2,901  -535  -351  -327  -403  -520  -92  -573  -356  -342  -559 
     Biofuel crops  0  0  758  149  72  168  705  0  1,177  182  418  930 
     Other agriculture  5,754  6,686  -243  -65  -42  -46  -231  2  -358  -39  -122  -296 
                             Mining  33  54  -5  -5  -5  -5  -5  -1  -4  -4  -3  -4 
   Manufacturing  278  320  -20  -16  -16  -14  -17  -4  -21  -13  -12  -18 
     Food processing  212  209  -2  0  0  2  -2  1  -4  2  -1  -3 
     Biofuel processing  0  0  1  1  1  1  3  0  0  0  0  1 
     Other manufacturing  66  111  -19  -17  -17  -17  -18  -5  -17  -15  -12  -16 
   Other industries  188  240  11  14  14  12  10  3  9  11  12  3 
                             Private services  2,557  2,981  107  84  81  109  111  38  37  72  53  27 
   Government services  280  327  2  2  1  2  2  1  1  1  1  1 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  
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The downstream processing of biofuels creates very few jobs, with almost all employment effects 
from biofuel investments coming from feedstock production.
4
Changes in Household Incomes and Poverty 
 Moreover, unlike those in feedstock 
production, jobs in processing plants are largely reserved for semiskilled and skilled workers, most of 
whom must be sourced from other manufacturing subsectors as the biofuels sector grows. Lower-skilled 
feedstock farmers or laborers mainly come from within the agriculture sector itself. However, both 
sugarcane and cassava have lower-than-average labor–land ratios. This means that reallocating land to 
these crops effectively reduces demand for agricultural labor. Excess farmworkers therefore migrate to 
the nonfarm sector, especially into less skill-intensive trade and transport services. Establishing a biofuels 
industry in Tanzania will therefore create new job opportunities for some farmers but will also impose 
significant adjustment costs on other workers, especially those in export agriculture. 
Biofuel investments increase national GDP and factor returns, causing household incomes to rise. 
Although this is true in all the biofuel scenarios, there are significant differences in the distributional 
impacts across household groups. Table 11 reports changes in households’ equivalent variation, which is 
a welfare measure that controls for changes in prices. All rural quintiles benefit from the introduction of a 
biofuels industry in Tanzania. However, higher-income rural households benefit more under larger-scale 
production scenarios, such as Sugar 3 and Cassava 3, since most large-scale farmers fall into the higher 
expenditure quintiles. Lower-income households, in contrast, benefit more under smallholder outgrower 
schemes, especially when these schemes are combined with improvements in crop yields. 
                                                       
4 About 620 biofuel processing jobs are created in Sugar 1–3; 860 in Sugar 4; 1,600 in Sugar 5; 333 in Molasses; and 248 in 
Cassava 1–3.  24 
Table 11. Household per capita equivalent variation results, 2007–2015 








Deviation from baseline scenario growth rate (%-point) 

















  (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                          Rural  372.4  1.32  0.41  0.57  0.59  0.53  0.41  0.11  0.27  0.45  0.49  0.34 
   Quintile 1  109.8  0.82  0.31  0.19  0.18  0.58  0.30  0.06  0.29  0.59  0.22  0.53 
   Quintile 2  198.6  0.97  0.32  0.21  0.19  0.56  0.32  0.06  0.29  0.54  0.22  0.49 
   Quintile 3  283.7  0.99  0.37  0.25  0.24  0.60  0.36  0.07  0.32  0.59  0.25  0.53 
   Quintile 4  433.7  1.17  0.40  0.30  0.28  0.59  0.39  0.09  0.32  0.55  0.26  0.48 
   Quintile 5  967.4  1.31  0.44  0.57  0.59  0.55  0.44  0.12  0.28  0.45  0.47  0.33 
                          Urban   903.2  1.94  0.38  0.38  0.38  0.41  0.38  0.11  0.16  0.28  0.21  0.13 
   Quintile 1  120.6  1.22  0.35  0.28  0.27  0.43  0.35  0.08  0.22  0.25  0.22  0.15 
   Quintile 2  211.3  1.28  0.44  0.43  0.42  0.50  0.45  0.14  0.23  0.33  0.26  0.17 
   Quintile 3  307.6  1.38  0.54  0.53  0.53  0.58  0.54  0.17  0.26  0.41  0.31  0.21 
   Quintile 4  470.3  1.52  0.52  0.52  0.52  0.56  0.52  0.17  0.25  0.40  0.30  0.20 
   Quintile 5  1,614.2  2.08  0.34  0.35  0.35  0.37  0.34  0.10  0.13  0.25  0.19  0.11 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  
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Urban households also benefit from an increase in the economywide returns to labor and capital, 
and from the higher overall level of economic growth in the country. However, it is typically the middle 
of the urban income distribution that benefits the most, since these quintiles rely more heavily on labor 
wages for their incomes. Moreover, these households are typically endowed with semiskilled labor, which 
is used fairly intensively in the biofuel processing sectors (meaning as operators and technicians). 
The national distributional effects of biofuel investments on households’ equivalent variation are 
shown in Figure 2. Molasses generates very little additional value added in the economy and so its effects 
on household welfare are small. Although larger-scale sugarcane-based biofuel production is far more 
beneficial for households, it is higher-income households that benefit far more than lower-income 
households (meaning the curve for Sugar 3 is upward sloping). By contrast, the welfare gains are more 
evenly distributed across expenditure quintiles when outgrower schemes are used to produce sugarcane 
(meaning Sugar 1). Increasing smallholders’ crop yields produces the most pro-poor welfare outcomes. 
This is reflected in the figure by the higher and downward sloping curves for the Sugar 4 and Cassava 2 
scenarios. The mixed cassava production approach (meaning Cassava 3) is the least effective of the 
cassava scenarios in raising household welfare, with higher-income households benefiting the most in this 
scenario. This is because the displacement of existing farmland in order to establish commercial farms to 
produce this land-intensive crop is particularly severe for smallholders. Finally, the Jatropha scenario 
produces large welfare gains for lower-income households since it assumes high crop yields and engages 
a large number of smallholder farmers. 
Figure 2. Change in per capita equivalent variation from baseline scenario by quintile, 2007–2015 
 
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Note: Equivalent variation is a measure of household welfare that controls for changes in commodity prices. Expenditure 
quintiles are based on per capita consumption spending.  
























































































Table 12 reports changes in national poverty rates for the various biofuel scenarios. The 
headcount rate, which measures the share of the population under the poverty line, declines the most 
under the two yield-improvement scenarios. Poverty reduction is also more pronounced for technologies 
that more heavily engage smallholder farmers. There is little difference in poverty outcomes, however, 
between the purely large-scale sugarcane scenario (meaning Sugar 3) and the scenario that produces 20 
percent of feedstock using smallholders (meaning Sugar 2). Similarly, the poverty effects of the mixed 
cassava production approach (meaning Cassava 3) are also fairly modest compared to the purely 
smallholder-based approaches. This suggests that increasing the participation of smaller-scale farmers 
generates significant gains in poverty reduction, especially when additional investments enhance crop 
productivity.  27 
Table 12. Poverty results, 2007–2015 






Deviation from final baseline scenario poverty rate, 2015 (%-point) 

















  (FAO 1)  (FAO 2)  -  (FAO 3)  (FAO 4)  (FAO 5)  -  (FAO 8)  (FAO 9)  (FAO 10) 
                          Headcount (P0)  40.00  36.77  -1.36  -1.07  -1.05  -2.18  -1.33  -0.30  -1.28  -2.21  -1.15  -1.81 
   Rural  44.72  41.34  -1.37  -1.08  -1.05  -2.32  -1.33  -0.29  -1.34  -2.36  -1.20  -1.97 
   Urban  20.18  17.52  -1.32  -1.07  -1.05  -1.60  -1.32  -0.38  -1.00  -1.57  -0.94  -1.17 
                          Gap (P1)  13.23  12.00  -0.54  -0.36  -0.34  -1.00  -0.53  -0.11  -0.52  -1.04  -0.44  -0.82 
   Rural  15.01  13.70  -0.60  -0.39  -0.36  -1.12  -0.59  -0.12  -0.58  -1.18  -0.49  -0.93 
   Urban  5.76  4.89  -0.32  -0.25  -0.25  -0.48  -0.32  -0.08  -0.27  -0.46  -0.25  -0.33 
                          Squared gap (P2)  6.10  5.49  -0.27  -0.18  -0.17  -0.52  -0.27  -0.06  -0.27  -0.54  -0.23  -0.43 
   Rural  6.97  6.31  -0.31  -0.20  -0.18  -0.59  -0.30  -0.06  -0.30  -0.63  -0.25  -0.50 
   Urban  2.46  2.07  -0.13  -0.10  -0.10  -0.21  -0.13  -0.03  -0.12  -0.20  -0.11  -0.15 
                         
Source: Results from the Tanzania DCGE and microsimulation model. 
Notes: Sugar 1/2/3: Small-scale / mixed / large-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 4: Small-scale sugarcane production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Sugar 5: Small-scale sugarcane production (land expansion) with small-scale ethanol processing 
Molasses: Large-scale ethanol processing using imported molasses  
Cassava 1: Small-scale cassava production (land expansion) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Cassava 2/3: Small-scale / mixed cassava production (yield improvements) with large-scale ethanol processing 
Jatropha: Small-scale jatropha production with large-scale biodiesel processing  28 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Considerable uncertainty exists concerning the potential gains from establishing biofuel industries in low-
income countries. Particular concern is raised over possible trade-offs between biofuel and food 
production. It is therefore essential that governments in countries such as Tanzania understand how 
different biofuel technologies can contribute to achieving national development objectives. Drawing on 
detailed production cost estimates, this study developed a dynamic economywide model of Tanzania to 
estimate the growth and distributional implications of alternative biofuel production scenarios. These 
scenarios differed in the feedstocks used to produce biofuels (sugarcane, molasses, and cassava), the scale 
of feedstock production (small-scale outgrowers versus larger-scale plantations), and the way in which 
feedstock production is increased (yield improvements versus land expansion).  
Model results indicate that although some individual farmers may shift resources away from 
producing food crops, there is no national-level trade-off between biofuel and food production in 
Tanzania. Rather, it is traditional export crops that will be adversely affected by a sizable appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. Indeed, it is the large size of Tanzania’s agricultural export sector that prevents 
food production from contracting. This is because the amount of land displaced by biofuel feedstock is 
smaller than the lands released by declining traditional export crops. As a result, food production 
increases slightly under most biofuel investment scenarios. Overall, national GDP rises and new 
employment opportunities are created in biofuel sectors. This leads to welfare gains throughout the 
income distribution, albeit following a possible period of adjustment in which prices, farmworkers, and 
nonbiofuel exporters adapt to new market conditions. 
Our findings suggest that although all biofuel production scenarios improve household welfare, it 
is small-scale outgrower schemes, especially for typical smallholder crops such as cassava and jatropha, 
that are most effective at raising poorer households’ incomes. Tanzania should therefore explore 
opportunities to engage smallholders in the production of biofuels, possibly through mixed small- and 
large-scale production systems. However, supporting evidence indicates that these mixed systems may 
reduce the profitability of biofuels in Tanzania and reduce the reliability of feedstock supply for 
downstream processing. Here our findings confirm the welfare gains achieved by producing feedstock 
through yield improvements rather than land expansion. Given the strong pro-poor outcomes and greater 
profitability, our findings favor a cassava-based biofuels industry for Tanzania. 
There are, however, a number of limitations to our analysis. First, although the scenarios based on 
yield improvements generated the highest levels of pro-poor growth, we accounted for only the private 
costs involved in establishing the biofuels industry. We did not include public-sector costs, such as the 
provision of irrigation and farm inputs to improve farmers’ productivity. Given the difficulties that 
Tanzania’s government has faced in the past in raising smallholders’ crop yields, some of the yield-
oriented biofuel scenarios may prove overly optimistic.  
Second, although the modeled scenarios assume competition for labor inputs (meaning there is no 
excess labor capacity that can be absorbed by the growing biofuels sector or feedstock producers), most 
scenarios assume that at least half of the agricultural land required to produce feedstocks will be obtained 
through the clearing of currently unutilized land (Arndt et al. [2009] adopt a similar assumption for 
Mozambique). If, in reality, more land is displaced by biofuel feedstock production, the results with 
respect to domestic food production may be less positive. Even so, some believe that biofuels will 
displace even less of the land currently utilized for agricultural production in Tanzania (see Cardona et al. 
2009), and hence we believe our assumptions are sufficiently conservative. 
Third, in all the biofuel scenarios, we did not consider the cost of providing the infrastructure or 
tax incentives that may be demanded by foreign investors to produce biofuels in Tanzania. If these public 
investments are not in accordance with the government’s national development plan, then they will incur 
opportunity costs. Finally, our analysis also did not compare the benefits of investing in biofuels vis-à-vis 
other social and economic sectors. However, excluding public-sector costs, our results indicate that 
establishing a biofuels industry in Tanzania can contribute to achieving the country’s development 
objectives of enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty.  29 
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